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Summary
Human emotional life is structured and to a certain extent con-
stituted by language, and yet making sense of and communicat-
ing how we feel is often a challenge. In this article, I will argue 
that a person’s struggle to make sense of and articulate her suf-
fering plays a major role in the experience of suffering. I unfold 
this argument in five steps. I will first look at the vexed question 
of what emotions are. Discussing biological and rational con-
ceptions of emotions, I argue that human emotions are deeply 
ambiguous phenomena constituted by an opaque combination 
of biological factors and rational factors. In the second section, 
I will argue that instead of trying to solve the ontological rid-
dle of emotions we should investigate the actual experience of 
emotions. I examine the dialectics of the conceptual and the 
phenomenal aspects of our emotional experience, arguing that 
we need to adopt a phenomenological approach to emotions in 
order to explore the ambiguity of emotions. Anxiety is endemic 
to most mental illnesses, and nowhere does the ambiguity of our 
emotions become more manifest than in the experience of anxi-
ety. So in the following two sections, I will look at two influential 
philosophical accounts of anxiety. Heidegger and Kierkegaard 
both argue that anxiety is intrinsic to our experience of freedom. 
I criticise Heidegger’s theory for restricting the phenomenology 
of anxiety by making it a functional tool in his ontological pro-
ject. I then argue that Kierkegaard’s theory, on the other hand, 
allows us to explore the significance of the phenomenological 
ambiguity of anxiety. Of particular importance in Kierkegaard’s 
theory is the dialectics of imagination and reality at work in 
anxiety, and in the concluding section, I will look at how this 
dialectics can help us understand how both the patient and the 
psychiatrist are challenged with the problem of finding a lan-
guage for mental suffering. 
Key words
Biology • Rationality • Autonomy • Anxiety • Imagination • Phenom-
enology • Heidegger • Kierkegaard
Mental suffering as a struggle with words: language and emotion
R. Rosfort
Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Correspondence
Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Farvergade 27D, 1463 Copenhagen, Denmark • Tel. +45 33766910 • 
E-mail: rer@teol.ku.dk
What emotions are: biology and rationality 
Language is fundamental to human emotional experi-
ence. We assess, interpret and communicate our emo-
tions with the help of concepts and words. Language is 
constitutive of human emotional experience to the ex-
tent that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of 
human emotions entirely devoid of intentional structure 
and rational features. Concepts such as anger, shame, 
love, humiliation, and pride orient our existence. With-
out concepts to help us understand and deal with our 
emotional life, we would be slaves of our passions. Lan-
guage enables us to seize the reins of, or at least some 
aspects of, our emotional experience, and to construct 
a life with our emotions instead of being at the mercy of 
our constantly changing, and often seemingly arbitrary, 
affective landscape. Using language, concepts, and ra-
tionality to overcome the passivity involved in emotional 
experience has, since antiquity, been the primary goal of 
the work on emotions by philosophers, physicians and 
theologians. However, in spite of centuries of intellectual 
endeavours our emotions continue to challenge both the 
theoretical and practical attempts of domesticating them. 
Words seem unable to describe adequately the motley 
abundance of our feelings, and the conceptual nets that 
we throw out to capture the significance of our emotional 
experience only deliver a pale shadow of the sense of in-
timacy and alienation involved in those experiences. This 
inability to fathom and make sense of emotions means 
that passivity continues to be the principal and seemingly 
inescapable character of human emotional experience. 
In fact, passivity is constitutive of the basic significance 
of the concepts “emotion”, “passion”, “feeling”, “senti-
ment”, “mood” that we use to make sense of our emo-
tional life 1-3. 
Human beings experience themselves as autonomous 
creatures. We are able to choose between options, make 
plans, and – if we are fortunate enough to be born under 
the right circumstances – shape the course of our lives. 
We do not choose our emotions, however. Emotions are 
deeply ambiguous phenomena. They are an integral part 
of our most intimate thoughts, ideas and plans, but they 
are also disturbing and alienating. Emotional experience 
thus involves a complex sense of both autonomy and het-
eronomy. Our emotions can make our words feel wrong 
or shallow just as much as true and right. They stimulate 
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it as a disease of the brain comparable to other organic 
diseases and treatable with medication” 4 [p. 188]. This 
double vision is only a problem, however, if we insist to 
do away with the complexity it entails by reducing one 
vision of mental illness to the other. Psychiatry sees dou-
ble because we human beings see, feel and understand 
ourselves double. We are ambiguous creatures, or more 
precisely, as formulated by the ancient hermetic saying 
that gained popularity among natural philosophers in the 
enlightenment: “A human being is simple by the fact that 
it is alive, ambiguous by virtue of being human [Homo 
simplex in vitalitate duplex in humanitate]” 5. We are bio-
logical creatures who are aware of the fact that we are 
shaped and conditioned by a multitude of biological fac-
tors that we do not know or understand, and are often not 
even aware of. Mental illness is a complex conglomer-
ate of rationality and biology, and whether one argues 
that mental illness is basically a question of biology  6-8 
or holds that rationality is the key to understand mental 
illness 9-11, it is hardly in doubt that we need to consider 
both aspects of mental suffering when exploring mental 
illness. And nowhere is the interplay of biology and ra-
tionality more manifest than in our emotional life. 
The question whether emotions are primarily subjective 
or primarily biological is a heavily debated issue in emo-
tion studies. While the emotions of other animals seem 
to be biological functions developed to optimise evolu-
tionary survival and reproduction  12  13, the multifarious 
character of human emotions seem to go way beyond 
such functional goals. Like the human body generally, 
human emotions seem to be uniquely detached from 
the biological functions that characterise non-human 
emotions  14  15. This detached character of human emo-
tions was already noticed more than a millennium ago 
by the Stoic philosopher Seneca: “Wild animals run from 
dangers they actually see, and once they have escaped 
them worry no more. We, however, are tormented alike 
by what is past and what is to come” 16 [p. 38]. Contem-
porary philosophers of emotion usually follow Seneca’s 
lead arguing that human emotions are categorically dif-
ferent from non-human emotions in virtue of being men-
tal phenomena, and as such structured by human inten-
tionality, rationality and cognitive capacities. At the same 
time, though, it seems difficult to jettison the observable 
fact that human emotions are nevertheless deeply em-
bodied phenomena informed by biological factors that 
escape our experiential awareness, our rationality, and 
often thwart our cognitive control. Accordingly, most 
contemporary philosophical theories of emotion do, in 
fact, insist on and even cherish this embodied character 
of emotions  17-20. Few of them, though, are inclined to 
accept the ontological argument of contemporary neu-
roscientists and evolutionary psychologists that human 
our ideas and incite our thoughts, but they also compli-
cate our choices. We are not in complete control of what 
we see, smell, hear, touch and think about. A piece of 
music, a smile, a hurtful word can change the way we 
feel about a situation. Lack of sleep or a busy day can 
make us irritable and do or say things that we do not 
want to. Anger, impatience, love and excitement often 
overcome us and make our ideas, plans and actions spiral 
out of cognitive control. Living with our emotions is diffi-
cult because our feelings can change in spite of ourselves 
– sometimes drastically in a second, at other times unno-
ticeably over the years. Articulating our emotions through 
language, understanding how and why we feel the way 
we do, enables us to deal with the passivity at work in 
our emotions, creating a life that is not under the sway 
of our unpredictable emotional changes. The problem is 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to articulate, describe 
and make sense of the full scope of our emotional life. 
Aspects of our emotional life are cognitively impenetra-
ble. Language and rationality cannot always reveal why 
a particular person irritates us or why we are jealous; nor 
whether or not our love will last, when our patience will 
run out, and if we will ever stop being angry. In other 
words, what emotions reveal is that understanding is nev-
er completely stable or entirely transparent. To live with 
our emotions is to work constantly with the experience 
of passivity involved in the limits of our understanding of 
the world, other people and ourselves.
Mental illness is a major medical, social and personal 
challenge to our understanding of what it means to be hu-
man. Why is the human mind so fragile? What is mental 
suffering? How can a memory, thoughts or words render 
a person unable to cope with everyday life? Emotions are 
important to our attempt to make sense of mental illness 
due to – among other things – the fact that the experience 
of passivity is a critical feature of the suffering involved 
in mental illness. Mental suffering affects our sense of our 
autonomy by diminishing, and at times completely inca-
pacitating, our ability to make sense of our experiences 
and control our thoughts and actions. In this sense, men-
tal illness challenges our understanding of human beings 
as autonomous creatures. Autonomy is not only an ex-
periential fact, but also a demand. We do not only feel 
that we can choose, we also want to and are expected 
to make our own choices. The ambiguous character of 
our emotions brings out this dialectics of autonomy and 
heteronomy at play in mental illness. 
The historian of psychiatry Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen ar-
gues that “[t]he problem is that contemporary psychiatry 
sees double. On the one hand, it views mental illness 
as a malady of the mind (one no longer dares say “of 
the soul”) that ought to be treated with talk therapy, em-
pathy and human rapport. On the other hand, it views 
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dialectics of intimacy and alienation that we experience 
with many of our emotions. Our emotions are the most 
intimate and personal part of our identity. They are the 
expressions of our dreams, fears, hopes, desires and more 
pragmatic concerns, and yet often they also reveal the 
limits of our self-understanding by making us aware of 
sides of ourselves that we do not recognise, and aspects 
of our personality that we do not want to acknowledge. 
Put differently, our emotions destabilise our sense of our 
autonomy. They can alienate, frighten, embarrass, and 
even disgust us, but they are still an inescapable part of 
who we are.
How emotions feel: phenomena and concepts 
This dialectic of intimacy and alienation lies at the heart 
of the limits of language, which is one of the principal, 
and most concrete, challenges that our emotional life 
confronts us with. As mentioned above, we often experi-
ence that emotions are cognitively impenetrable 3 17. This 
experience can be both a source of frustration and joy. It 
is a pleasure to experience that we are capable of feeling 
and doing more than expressed by the language we use. 
It can, however, also be frustrating to experience that our 
words are not able to convey or articulate what we actu-
ally feel, or that we are not able to ferret out the occluded 
meanings of our emotions. In the best cases, the ineffable 
character of our emotions puts into motion our imagina-
tion producing other forms of communication in terms of 
gestures, movements, unexpected actions, and the innu-
merable forms of artistic production. Often, though, the 
struggle with language is a cause of suffering. Articulat-
ing, interpreting and communicating our emotions is not 
simply an option. It is, as philosophers argue and poets 
show, an inescapable part of the emotional experience 
itself. We feel the need to articulate and make sense of 
our emotions through language just as strongly as we feel 
how emotions transcend our conceptual, rational, and 
linguistic capacities. Humans are not only rational and 
social animals. They are also, as the philosopher Charles 
Taylor once aptly put it, self-interpreting animals 30. We 
want – and other people expect us – to make sense of our 
emotions, to provide a rational explanation for them, and 
to communicate (at least some of) them to other people. 
For this we need language, or more precisely, concepts, 
words and metaphors. 
The problem with emotional experience, contrary to 
more unambiguously cognitive phenomena, is that lan-
guage often does not coincide with or is able to accu-
rately capture the felt meaning of an emotion. Emotions 
such as shame, love and forgiveness are dense concepts 
that provide central points of orientation in our exist-
ence, and as such their significance have been explored 
emotions are biological functions, and thus only differ-
ent in degree from the emotions of other animals  21-25. 
We seem to be left with an unresolvable debate between 
philosophers who argue for the cognitive nature of emo-
tions and neuroscientists who insist that emotions are pri-
marily biological. Once again, this ambiguity is only a 
problem if our goal is to develop an unambiguous theory 
of emotions that explains (away) the incomprehensible 
character of our emotional life. There is no escaping the 
ontological question. The biological and rational aspects 
of our emotions do affect, and often dramatically so, our 
thoughts, feelings, and actions. However, instead of be-
ing preoccupied with exclusive ontological explanations 
of what emotions really are, we should rather accept that 
our emotions are ontologically ambiguous, that is, that 
emotions are both rational and biological, and that nei-
ther of these two basic features of our emotional life can 
be reduced to the other. Accepting this complexity will 
allow us to direct our intellectual energy to the concrete 
challenges that the tension between those two features 
bring about in our emotional life.
Human emotional life is impregnated with vestigial 
traces of an evolutionary history that goes back millions 
of years. The evolution of the human body has shaped 
our emotional functioning to the extent that many of our 
emotional dispositions and reactions were developed 
long before we came into existence. This does not entail 
– as the advocates of the biological approach to emotions 
often claim – that human emotional life can be explained 
by reducing the vast array of human emotions to a lim-
ited number of basic emotions or cross-species emotional 
systems. Besides the obvious fact that this theory of the 
remote evolutionary significance of our emotional behav-
iour is not able to account for, let alone explain, the prox-
imate, rational and deeply personal significance of our 
emotions, the fundamental idea of fully consolidated and 
fixed emotional systems is constructed upon a simplistic 
theory of evolution 26-28. What seems to be an unquestion-
able point of the biological argument – although many 
philosophers find it difficult to accept – is that our emo-
tional life cannot be confined to the meaning of our own 
personal history, or even to that of our hominid ances-
tors, but extends back through the abysmal phylogenetic 
development of the mammal organism. So although our 
feelings of, for example, anger, joy, excitement, desire 
and disappointment most of the time are directed at per-
sons, objects, or events that are part of our life (in terms of 
current experiences, memories, expectations, and ideas), 
they are nevertheless realised, shaped and constantly in-
formed by the impersonal biological functioning of an 
organism that does not belong to us alone. This coexist-
ence of evolutionary and personal histories explains one 
of the principal features of our emotional life, namely, the 
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conceptual structures. The dialectics of concepts and 
phenomena is particularly important when it comes to 
emotional experience due to the explicit tension between 
conceptual meaning (what an emotion means) and felt 
significance (how an emotion feels) at work in our feeling 
of emotions. The concepts that we use to construct a phe-
nomenological account of emotion have to be sensitive 
to this dialectics in order to respect the immediate, pre-
reflective feeling of an emotional experience as well as 
the conceptual structures and intentional dynamics that 
allow us to make sense of that experience. 
One of the most important concepts in psychiatry that 
brings out the full scope of this dialectics is the concept 
of anxiety. The experience of anxiety is peculiar in virtue 
of its marked ambiguity. Most emotional experiences are 
characterised by a cognitive or intentional structure (e.g. 
when I love, I love somebody; when I am angry, I am nor-
mally angry with someone because of something; when I 
am afraid, I am at most times afraid of or for something), a 
typical temporal duration, and a characteristic emotional 
tonality (e.g. sadness, joy, exhaustion, excitement, bore-
dom). These features help us describe our emotions and 
inform our attempt to construct a conceptual taxonomy 
of our emotional experience (for example, emotions, feel-
ings, and moods) that, in turn, allows us to explore our 
emotional lives. The experience of anxiety is more difficult 
to describe and capture conceptually than most other kinds 
of emotional experience. Anxiety does not have an obvi-
ous object, a typical duration or a characteristic emotional 
tonality. Rather than helping us to describe and define a 
particular emotional experience, the concept of anxiety 
problematises our conceptual attempts to make sense of 
our emotions. Anxiety seems to be strangely protean and 
parasitic in the sense that it can express itself in multifari-
ous ways (e.g., it can be ephemeral as well as deep-seated; 
hopeful as well as hopeless) and attach itself to contrast-
ing emotions (e.g. both love and hate, joy and fear can be 
anxious). In this way, anxiety brings out the dialectics of 
concepts and phenomena by articulating the ambiguities 
involved in emotional experience.
Two thinkers who in particular have formed our under-
standing of anxiety are Kierkegaard and Heidegger. They 
both make use of a phenomenological approach to anxi-
ety 33-35. Moreover, both characterise anxiety not only as 
a fundamental mood of human existence, but consider it 
inescapably connected with our experience of freedom, 
and as such one of the basic features that distinguish hu-
man beings from other animals. In spite of these similari-
ties (which are not surprising, since Heidegger’s theory is 
heavily inspired by Kierkegaard’s), their theories of anxi-
ety are significantly different. In the two following sec-
tions, I will present their respective theories, arguing that 
while Heidegger’s phenomenology of anxiety is restricted 
throughout millennia by philosophers, poets, politicians, 
musicians and painters. And most of us have a more or 
less articulated understanding of the significance of those 
emotions informed by our upbringing, culture, and every-
day amassment of experiences. Still, our feeling of those 
emotions rarely coincides with the understanding that 
we have of them. Our feeling is often opaque, and this 
opacity puts our understanding to work. In other words, 
often there exists a tension, sometimes even a conflict, 
between the felt significance of an emotion and the artic-
ulated, conceptual meaning of that emotion. It is this ten-
sion between conceptual meaning and non-conceptual 
significance that is at the centre of the debate between 
the biological and philosophical theories of emotion. The 
problem with this debate is that these two different ap-
proaches begin with preconceived ontological concep-
tions of what emotions are, and that such preconceptions 
are unable to articulate, let alone make sense of, the 
ambiguity of human emotional experience. Another ap-
proach to the problem of language and emotions is to be-
gin with the phenomenology of emotion, that is, to look 
more closely at how we experience emotions and to try 
to articulate the felt meaning of our emotions. 
A phenomenological approach has the advantage over 
other theories of emotion that it begins with the experi-
ence of emotions rather than with conceptions of what 
emotions are. The strength of phenomenology lies in the 
systematic investigation of the first-person perspective. 
While both the cognitive and biological approaches con-
struct theories about what emotions are, phenomenology 
explores how emotions feel. In other words, a phenome-
nological approach takes more seriously than most other 
approaches the (often) opaque and inexpressible experi-
ence of emotions. It is, of course, obvious that phenom-
enology makes use of conceptual preconceptions just 
as much as other philosophical theories. In that sense, 
the phenomenological conception of experience is itself 
a theoretical construct 31. Nevertheless, making the sub-
jective experience of emotions the primary object of in-
vestigation allows phenomenology to articulate and give 
a systematic account of the experiential dimension of 
emotions that escapes both the biological approach and 
many of the philosophical approaches. The concepts that 
phenomenology makes use of are coined on the anvil 
of pre-reflective experience rather than being excogitated 
from reflective conceptions of the rational or biological 
nature of emotions. An important part of the work of phe-
nomenology is exactly the incessant reconsideration of 
the unstable and problematic dialectical relationship be-
tween concepts and phenomena 32. Articulating this dia-
lectic helps us to make sense of the conceptual structure 
of our immediate experience, while allowing the expe-
riential phenomena themselves to challenge those same 
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which Heidegger later in the book famously describes 
as the essential expression of our being-towards-death 36 
[pp. 251, 254, 265-66], we are confronted with ourselves 
and with the inescapable responsibility for the authentic-
ity of our existence. 
The simple point of this analysis is that anxiety throws us 
back at ourselves, confronts us with ourselves, showing us 
that freedom is the necessary and yet evasive foundation 
of our existence. The staggering complexity of the analy-
sis shows itself in the moment one tries to understand this 
freedom or this being free to freedom that makes up the 
foundation of existence. Heidegger sketches an image of 
human existence as freedom’s anxious and often mistak-
en attempts to express itself in an existence characterised 
by mechanical chatter and imitative independence. Hei-
degger’s chanting abjuration of the superficial emptiness 
of everyday-life and his insistence on freedom’s anxious 
attempts to disclose, express and understand the depths 
of being is marked by a peculiar dichotomy between the 
superficial meaninglessness of the humdrum of everyday 
life and a deeper ontological meaning. This dichotomy is 
problematic. It is part of a philosophical quest for deep 
meaning that disfigures our attempt to make sense of and 
relate ourselves to the concrete challenges that anxiety 
confronts us with. The dichotomy is also the consequence 
of the ambivalence which characterises Heidegger’s radi-
cal transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
On the one hand, Heidegger criticises Husserl’s under-
standing of phenomenology as a “rigorous science” and 
attempts to deconstruct Husserl’s ideal of purity by driving 
the concept of intentionality out of the philosophical lab-
oratory and returning it to the tumultuous life-world 37 38. 
We cannot clarify and make sense of our experience and 
understanding by theoretical reductions of the facticity 
of a concrete life. We have to investigate human experi-
ence and understanding through our affective being-in-
the-world, that is, our moods, cares and concerns. He 
thus develops a hermeneutical phenomenology that ar-
ticulates our attempts to understand ourselves through 
a hermeneutics of facticity. On the other hand, though, 
Heidegger continues and develops certain aspects of 
Husserl’s philosophical laboratory, which stand in stark 
contrast to his insistence on the attuned facticity of hu-
man existence. The most important of these aspects is his 
insistence on philosophy as a quest for foundational a 
priori, ontological structures that work in the depths of 
human existence hidden under the chaotic multiplicity of 
empirical life. He explains this dichotomy between deep 
ontological meaning and superficial empirical meaning 
in the following way: “As compared with the ontic inter-
pretation, the existential and ontological interpretation is 
not only a theoretical and ontic generalization […] The 
“generalization” is an a priori-ontological one. It does not 
by being entangled in a fundamental ontological project, 
Kierkegaard’s theory allows us to explore the significance 
of the phenomenological ambiguity of anxiety. 
Heidegger on the ontological significance  
of anxiety
Heidegger’s influential treatment of the concept of anxi-
ety in his work Sein und Zeit is, at one and the same 
time, seductively simple and staggeringly complex. Even 
though anxiety vibrates as an affective tone throughout 
the whole work, the explicit analysis of anxiety is limited 
to one paragraph of seven pages. Anxiety functions, for 
Heidegger, as a disclosure of a human being’s [Dasein] 
being in-the-world, involving two basic and interrelated 
features. The first feature is the necessary character of hu-
man freedom, that is, human beings can and ought to 
choose themselves. Freedom is the fundamental being of 
human beings, and our work with this intrinsic freedom 
articulates the second feature of anxiety, namely, the dis-
closure of the necessary and yet constantly evasive foun-
dation that lurks in the depth of human existence and 
makes possible an authentic life. Heidegger summarises 
these two functions in his characteristically idiosyncratic 
way: “Anxiety reveals in Dasein its being toward its own-
most potentiality of being, that is, being free for the free-
dom of choosing and grasping itself. Anxiety brings Da-
sein before its being free for... (propensio in), the authen-
ticity of its being as possibility which it always already is. 
But at the same time, it is this being to which Da-sein as 
being-in-the-world is entrusted” 36 [p. 188]. The analysis 
of anxiety is part of the comprehensive investigation of 
human facticity, our concrete way of being-in-the-world, 
through the central concepts attunement (Befindlichkeit) 
and care. Our existence is affective, which means that our 
existence is never a dispassionate process of understand-
ing, but always characterised by basic moods (Stimmun-
gen) which shape our being-in-the world. These moods 
are not arbitrary or insignificant. They are, on the con-
trary, intimately connected with our understanding and 
interpretation of our existence, of which care is revealed 
as the basic ontological foundation. Anxiety is crucial for 
Heidegger’s analysis of moods, since it is a “fundamental 
attunement” that articulates “the eminent disclosedness 
of Dasein” 36 [p. 184]. Whereas fear is directed towards 
something specific that threatens our existence, anxiety 
is characterised by the lack of such a concrete threat, 
and therefore the cause of anxiety is in itself indefina-
ble. This indefinable character of anxiety means that it 
is existence itself which is at stake in anxiety. In anxiety, 
“the world has the character of complete insignificance”, 
and the meaning of our existence “collapses into itself” 36 
[p. 186]. In this anxious experience of meaninglessness, 
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brings out the dialectics of conceptual meaning and felt 
significance that is a basic feature of emotions in general. 
Clarifying this dialectics is central to our understanding of 
mental illness because it can help us to achieve a better 
understanding of the dialectics of autonomy and heter-
onomy at work in emotional experience. The suffering in-
volved in mental illness is connected with this dialectics 
in the sense that not being able to articulate, make sense 
of, and communicate our mental suffering is part of the 
suffering itself. It is exactly this complex phenomenologi-
cal aspect of anxiety that Heidegger’s ontological analy-
sis does not pay attention to. The dialectics of autonomy 
and heteronomy is, however, at the heart of Kierkegaard’s 
analysis. 
Kierkegaard on the psychological significance 
of anxiety
For Kierkegaard, anxiety expresses the concrete ambigu-
ity that characterises human experience of freedom, and 
he describes anxiety as “the dizziness of freedom” that 
occurs when freedom “looks down into its own possibil-
ity” 46 [p. 61]. Anxiety is indefinable, and yet it has deci-
sive phenomenological effects on our attempts to make 
sense of our existence. It is the unruly phenomenologi-
cal character of anxiety that destabilises our understand-
ing of what it means to be human. It instils a disturb-
ing insecurity into our attempt to define a phenomenon 
and make sense of it through language and by means of 
concepts and rationality. It functions as an “intermedi-
ary term” between sensibility and understanding, and as 
such “it possesses the ambiguity which saves thought” 46 
[p.  379]. That which in Kierkegaard’s analysis saves 
thought is the phenomenological dialectics of concepts 
and phenomena. It is exactly with respect to the ques-
tion of phenomenology that the difference between Hei-
degger and Kierkegaard becomes most obvious. While 
phenomenology for “the anti-dialectician Heidegger”, as 
Michael Theunissen calls him 47 [p. 28], is a tool to de-
scriptively destruct the superficial level of facticity in or-
der to disclose the ontological way in which being mani-
fests itself in Dasein, Kierkegaard’s phenomenology does 
not, as Heidegger himself points out 36 [pp. 235n, 338n], 
operate with a distinction between the ontic humdrum 
of everyday life and the deep ontological meaning. More 
generally, his analysis does not aim at a fundamental on-
tology. Phenomenology for Kierkegaard is inescapably 
connected with subjectivity and with the indescribable 
ways in which a person experiences the world, other 
people, and herself. Phenomenology does not stand in 
the service of ontology in the sense that phenomeno-
logical descriptions of superficial phenomena are meant 
to reveal a deeper and more fundamental being. Rather, 
mean ontic qualities that constantly keep emerging, but a 
constitution of being which always already underlies” 36 
[p. 199]. 
Heidegger’s philosophy is in many ways an attempt to 
articulate, problematise and reconsider this distinction 
between the concrete ontic beings (Seiende) and the 
evasive ontological being (Sein). As he explains in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: “What kind 
of distinction is this? “Being of Beings”? Being and be-
ings. Let us freely concede that it is obscure and cannot 
straightforwardly be made like that between black and 
white, house and garden”, and yet, “being is not some 
being among others” 39 [pp. 517-18]. This investigation of 
the distinction between the ontic and the ontological has 
been an important contribution to the reconsideration of 
traditional philosophical questions concerning the a prio-
ri and a posteriori, universal and particular, metaphysica 
specialis and metaphysica generalis, and more generally 
to the question of philosophy and metaphysics. However, 
I would argue that Heidegger’s insistence on this distinc-
tion also has a problematic effect on Heidegger’s phe-
nomenology, and in particular on his approach to and 
conception of anxiety. 
If Heidegger criticises Husserl’s transcendental phenom-
enology for its abstract and expressionless concept of in-
tentionality, one can criticise Heidegger’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology for its bodiless concept of facticity. In 
fact, major philosophers have pointed to several prob-
lems with the anonymous and bodiless ontology at the 
heart of Heidegger’s philosophy 40-44. Like Husserl, Hei-
degger was extremely critical of the scientific flowering 
in the dawn of the twentieth century and sought to con-
struct a watershed between true philosophy and other 
sciences such as psychology and biology. This insistence 
on developing a fundamental ontology in isolation from 
empirical or even psychological investigations of human 
existence is a severe problem for Heidegger’s analysis 
of anxiety. The phenomenon is reduced to a function 
in his theoretical attempt to articulate the fundamental 
being of which the human being is the conscious part. 
This means that his analysis of anxiety is conditioned by 
a hermeneutics which, in its philosophical care for the 
unfathomable meaning of being, is blind to the concrete 
existential meanings of anxiety. The relation between the 
conceptual and phenomenological aspects of emotions 
such as sadness, love, envy, compassion, jealousy, rage, 
ambition and desire is not explored in Heidegger’s analy-
sis of anxiety. Therefore, his analysis does not help us to 
clarify and examine the complex life of human beings 
in which a disparate mixture of anonymous biology and 
personal reflection constantly challenges our understand-
ing of ourselves, the world, and other people. As argued 
in the previous sections, the marked ambiguity of anxiety 
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Kierkegaard develops his understanding of the concept 
through an examination of the concrete problems that 
come with our anxious existence. For Kierkegaard, one 
of the most ambiguous challenges that are revealed in 
our experience of anxiety is how to deal with the imagi-
native character of our existence. That is, how to make 
sense of and deal with the fact that we live our lives just 
as much in our minds as through our concrete bodies. 
One of the principal problems about human emotions 
is, as argued earlier, that although they are related to 
both the biological functioning of our bodies and the ra-
tional capacities of our minds, the felt meaning(s) of our 
emotional life seems to transcend or be detached from 
biological and rational explanations. For Kierkegaard, it 
is exactly this transcendence or detachment that makes 
possible human freedom and, consequently, awakens 
anxiety. How we relate ourselves to our freedom and to 
the anxious existence that our freedom makes possible 
depends on how we understand and make sense of our 
imaginative capacities.
Imagination is one of the principal features that distinguish 
human beings from other animals, making us the strange 
“intermediate creatures” that we are, that is, beings that 
are neither animals nor angels 46 [p. 155] 50 [p. 329]. Hu-
mans are not seamlessly integrated in the finite move-
ments of the world or in the infinite stability of heaven. 
In this sense, they are imperfect creatures that do not fit 
into a pre-structured realm of life, but who are creating 
their existence while living. This creative aspect of human 
existence is basic in Kierkegaard’s understanding of what 
it means to be human. To be human is to become human, 
and in this sense of becoming, imagination is critical. It is 
our imaginative capacities that allow us to become who 
we are, namely, individual selves who are neither mere 
bodily functions nor rational minds. This synthetic char-
acter of being a self is possible because of imagination, 
in the sense that without imagination the self would not 
be able to relate itself to the complex being that it is. This 
relation is made possible through the process of innumer-
able imaginary possibilities that destabilise the concrete 
being that we are. This is why Kierkegaard accentuates 
imagination as the most important of human capacities: 
“As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of 
infinitising; it is not a capacity, as are the others – if one 
wishes to speak in those terms, it is the capacity instar 
omnium. When all is said and done, whatever of feeling, 
knowing, and willing a human being has depends upon 
what imagination he has, upon how a human being re-
flects himself – that is, upon imagination” 51 [pp. 30-31].
The imaginative variations that populate and animate Ki-
erkegaard’s thinking are not to be considered as a colour-
ful garment covering deeper philosophical and theologi-
cal thoughts, nor are they there simply for our aestheti-
phenomenology and ontology stand in a mutual rela-
tionship. Phenomenological descriptions articulate and 
constantly put into question ontological preconceptions 
at work in our pre-reflective, immediate experience as 
well as our conceptual understanding of the world. In 
Kierkegaard’s work, phenomenology is used to describe 
and analyse the constant, and often failing, attempts of 
a human being to understand the innumerable ways in 
which she relates herself to herself through her relation 
to the world 48. And it is in this phenomenological work 
that anxiety plays a crucial role in virtue of the ontologi-
cal ambiguity that it articulates. 
For Kierkegaard, the work of freedom that we become 
aware of in anxiety is intimately connected with the 
peculiar experience of activity and passivity that char-
acterises human existence. Just as Heidegger points to 
in his analysis, it is in the lack of explicit and definable 
phenomena that anxiety poses its concrete challenge to 
our existence. Rather than pointing to new phenomena, 
anxiety changes the phenomena that we know or thought 
we knew by introducing a “sympathetic antipathy and 
antipathetic sympathy” 46 [p. 42] into our experience of 
those phenomena. This emotional tonality or atmosphere 
complicates our feeling and thinking and challenges our 
understanding by throwing us back upon ourselves, often 
in the form of questions such as: Why am I anxious? Did 
I really mean what I said? Was this the right choice? Why 
do I feel an attraction to her, when I despise her? Why do 
I find pleasure in my own humiliation? What is at stake 
in my painful fight for recognition? It is questions such 
as these that put our freedom to work, and saturate the 
affective history of our freedom 49. Kierkegaard’s writings 
in many ways constitute an exploration and clarification 
of the ways and impasses of freedom through the affec-
tive constellations that characterise human existence. The 
ambiguity of anxiety is, for Kierkegaard, the clearest ex-
pression of freedom as an experience, which is, at one 
and the same time, an affective expression of a need for 
autonomy and a cognitive challenge to articulate, make 
sense of, and realise this autonomy.
Now, my argument is that in order to face the challenge 
involved in anxiety we have to take seriously the psycho-
logical experience of ambiguity. It is in this psychological 
ambiguity that we can explore the existential significance 
of anxiety. Kierkegaard’s treatment of anxiety is, I would 
argue, more psychologically concrete than Heidegger’s. 
And while both their analyses of the phenomena are in-
trinsically complex, it is the psychologically concrete 
aspect of Kierkegaard’s exploration that makes his treat-
ment of anxiety less simplistic than Heidegger’s. While 
Heidegger’s analysis is marked by an idiosyncratic termi-
nology and functional determination of the phenomena 
of anxiety in terms of a fundamental ontological project, 
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emotional life. Language is a both a necessary part of and 
a challenge in our emotional life. Language is constitu-
tive of human emotions, and yet it is in and through our 
emotions that we most intimately experience the limits 
of language. We use language to articulate and deal with 
the passivity of our emotions, but language also becomes 
a problem through the experience of the persistence of 
passivity, that is, through the experience that we are not 
able to understand and control all aspects of how we feel. 
I argued that the challenge of language consists in the fact 
that we want to and are expected to understand and deal 
with this passivity. This challenge plays a critical role in 
mental suffering in the sense that our failed attempts to 
articulate, make sense of, and communicate our suffer-
ing exacerbates our suffering. In this concluding section, 
I want to argue that this challenge becomes even more 
demanding when we are confronted with the suffering 
of another person. Trying to deal with the suffering of an-
other, we are faced with the problem of imagining and 
understanding that person’s suffering. 
Suffering affects a person’s sense of autonomy, of being 
herself, and to help a person recover her sense of auton-
omy we need to understand how she suffers. Imagina-
tion is a fundamental aspect of both our understanding 
of another person’s suffering and of our endeavour to 
help the suffering person through communication. But, 
as Kierkegaard argues and most psychiatrists and psy-
chologists know from experience, the problem is that 
the reality of suffering cannot be imagined. This means 
that our articulation and understanding of suffering 
has to respect the ineffable, and often incomprehensi-
ble, reality of suffering. As we have seen, for Kierkeg-
aard, imagination is a critical, but highly ambiguous 
feature of being human. We are and become human 
only through our imaginative capacity, and yet this very 
capacity is also a problem. The human world is expe-
rienced as concrete, that is, particular, finite and sensi-
ble, and yet this concrete world is teeming with innu-
merable forms, expressions and possibilities of life that 
are beyond our imagination. It is a reality saturated with 
a concreteness animating the expressions of human suf-
fering that we try to make sense of through language. It 
seems an impossible task, but it is exactly the ambigu-
ity of imagination that keeps alive our attempt to make 
sense of another person’s suffering. The experience of 
the other person’s suffering is the concrete example of 
the unimaginable complexity at work in human emo-
tional life. We cannot find epistemic rest in either a bio-
logical or a rational explanation of the suffering we are 
confronted with in another person. I see, feel and think 
about the other person. The concreteness of that person 
is unmistakable. She is there in front of me, and as such 
unimaginably concrete. Her expressions, words, and 
cal pleasure. The imaginative intensity of Kierkegaard’s 
thinking is the enactment of the peculiar synthetic char-
acter of his understanding of human beings as concrete 
particular individuals who exist through abstract thinking 
and conceptual language. The concrete, almost sensible, 
poetics of his writing works with ways of expressing the 
general and uniform character of language and thinking 
through concrete particulars. This emphasis on the com-
plexity of the concrete and the abstract is also what brings 
out the problems involved in our imaginative capacities. 
The seemingly infinite possibilities that are made real by 
imagination can also make us lose our sense of reality. 
This reality is first and foremost characterised by being 
concrete, that is, a process that has grown together (con-
crescere) in a way that our imaginative capacities cannot 
imitate, produce, or mirror. It is, in other words, a reality 
that transcends the power of imagination; a reality against 
whose concreteness our imaginative variations fracture. 
Kierkegaard describes the difference between concrete 
reality and imagination in terms of suffering: “[C]ould 
a human being by means of his imagination experience 
exactly the same as in reality, live through it in the same 
way as if he lived through it in reality, learn to know him-
self as accurately and profoundly as in the experience of 
reality – then there would be no meaning in life. In that 
case, Governance would have structured life wrongly, for 
to what purpose, then, reality if by means of the imagina-
tion one could in advance absorb it in a completely real 
way; to what purpose, then, the seventy years if in the 
twenty-second year one could have experienced every-
thing! But such is not the case either, and therefore in turn 
the image produced by the imagination is not that of true 
perfection; it lacks something – the suffering of reality or 
the reality of suffering” 52 [p. 188]. 
With the question of real and imagined suffering we re-
turn to the question of emotion and language, and con-
sequently to the problem of autonomy and heteronomy 
in emotional experience. The experience of passivity 
involved in suffering challenges our sense of autonomy, 
and it is exactly this challenge of articulating and under-
standing suffering that is crucial to our approach to both 
diagnosis and therapy of mental illness. 
Feeling, imagining and understanding 
suffering
The ambiguity of anxiety brings out the dialectics of 
phenomena and concepts that I have argued is consti-
tutive of human emotional life. I also have argued that 
this dialectics of felt significance and conceptual mean-
ing is caused by the interplay of biological and rational 
features of our emotions, and that this dialectics, in turn, 
is responsible for the ambiguous role of language in our 
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imaginative psychopathological categories are crude and 
never able to penetrate into the heart of concrete suf-
fering, imaginative work with language, concepts and 
rationality is nevertheless necessary in the psychiatrist’s 
attempt to understand suffering. One of the most chal-
lenging aspects of this work is exactly to be aware of 
the dialectics of autonomy and heteronomy involved in 
the question of imagined and concrete suffering. Wolf-
gang Blankenburg was keenly aware of the problem of 
neglecting this dialectics: “‘Who is actually this human 
being that stands in front of me?’, ‘How do I do him jus-
tice?’, ‘How are we to understand and approach that 
which we perceive to be psychopathologically distinc-
tive about him?’. The future of psychiatry depends sig-
nificantly on the extent to which we succeed in answer-
ing such questions – not on the basis of preconceptions 
derived from an (implicit or explicit) worldview, but by 
means of a new form of empiricism” 54 [p. 184]. Contrary 
to the fossilised image of suffering at work in (some) ide-
als of psychiatric objectivity, Blankenburg argues for a 
conception of psychiatry that works with an entangle-
ment of subjectivity and objectivity in which “under-
standing rests on a process of reciprocal self-disclosure 
and world-disclosure that by stimulating and increasing 
itself challenges and thereby indirectly enhances itself” 54 
[p. 192]. The question of emotion and language, of phe-
nomena and concepts, is at the core of the “new form of 
empiricism” that Blankenburg argues for. Instead of try-
ing to make sense of the suffering of the patient in terms 
of unambiguous explanatory models of the “what” and 
“why” of a conception of mental illness, articulating the 
“how” of the suffering allows us to understand the au-
tonomous and unimaginable character of the individual 
person’s suffering. Every person suffers in his or her par-
ticular way. This is not to say that diagnostic and statisti-
cal criteria are vacuous or that the subjectivity of suffer-
ing precludes the use of objective categories of disorders 
to make sense of suffering. Rather, the phenomenology of 
suffering makes us aware of an autonomy that constantly 
destabilises our objective (pre)conceptions (the “what” 
and the “why”) of the reality of suffering. We need both 
language and objective measures in order to make sense 
of the particular ways a person struggles with his or her 
suffering. How we are to construct the language of suf-
fering, however, remains an open question that requires 
both passion and imagination. 
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